David Hume was a Scottish philosopher in the 18^th Century and was well known for his empiricist views on human nature. His most famous text was A Treatise of Human Nature, later rewritten as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, a work that grapples with ideas of perception, action, reason, and freedom. In his writing, Hume claims that actions are both determined and voluntary, an assertion backed by his theories of empathy and revision.

For Hume, the only thing on which humans can rely to determine reality is their experience. The world is experienced by the mind and in the mind there exist only perceptions. These perceptions are split into two categories: ideas and impressions. Impressions are sensations, or “lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will” (Baird, 369), while ideas are more faint versions of impressions—they “are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity” (Baird, 369). For example, the sensation of having one’s leg cut off is much more lively than simply imagining having one’s leg cut off. As all ideas come from the “creative power of the mind [which] amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience” (Baird, 369), our knowledge is simply a conglomeration of these experiences. Therefore, Hume continues, “though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits” (Baird, 369); we can only know what our experience shows us. In order to elucidate this point, Hume describes how, for example, though one has never seen a gold mountain, one can imagine the object by combining the idea of gold and of mountain to reach an imagined image according to “the mind and will” (Baird, 369).By extending this idea of the composition of impressions, Hume claims our knowledge is dependent on what Hume calls “constant conjunctions,” or the repeated association of two impressions. For example, if one experiences the sun rising one day, there is no way to know that it will also happen the next day. However, once the sun rises the next day, one has a sort of tentative knowledge, taking the form of a habit or custom that the sun will once again rise on the third day—knowledge is a lively, forceful form of “belief” (Baird, 384) the “custom” behind it is “that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past” (Baird, 382). Therefore, human reason, according to Hume, is “slave to passions;” these passions, rather than being emotions, are instead the felt impressions we experience when having sensory experiences. There can be no reasoning about the future or about any other aspect of reality without sensations, or impressions, acting as the baseline. In this way, Hume reinforces his previous claim that thought must exist within “narrow limits.” All thought and all reason are determined by the impressions and experiences of the mind in question.

It is only in addressing human actions that Hume’s philosophy allows action to be voluntary, rather than simply pre-determined. According to Hume, for one to take action based on one’s impressions, one must first use one’s “sympathy,” or what modern society calls “empathy.” The theory of sympathy requires that one consider whether the action one is considering taking would be useful and agreeable to the self and others. For example, if I am considering whether or not to skip class, based on my experience of there being snow outside and my not having appropriate shoes in which to talk to class, I would have to consider whether this action would be useful and agreeable to myself and to others who would be affected by this action. Perhaps it would be agreeable to me, as I get to stay in my warm room, and useful, as I would not ruin a non-winter pair of shoes, but it would surely not be agreeable to my professor, as I am not following my duty to be in class and am being disrespectful by not attending class, and it would not be useful for other people in the class for there would be fewer ideas in the room during our discussions. Continuing this example, it follows that I am free to decide whether or not to follow what my sympathy suggests that I should do, which is probably to go to class; that would be the proper choice to make. As Hume says, “by liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may” (Baird, 406). Therefore, the ultimate action is determined – the act of “going to class” – but I am at liberty to choose whether to go or not to go. In summation of his discussion of liberty, Hume states, “this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains” (Baird, 406).

Causation plays a key role in Hume’s philosophy of actions. Paradoxically, our actions are both revisable and innate. Constant conjunctions that humans experience through their experiences give us what Hume calls “knowledge,” or, in the most simple terms possible, the understanding that B follows A. In the Enquiry, Hume states that “necessity and causation [arise] entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other” (Baird, 400). Once we have made this inference, we move forward with the revision principle; we reflect on our ideas and how they should inform our actions and therefore our morality; we are free to act as our reflections and our empathy suggest we should act. This is nearly a restating of Hume’s ideas of liberty and determination—our actions are innate because, due to constant conjunctions and our knowledge, there are only so many actions we could possibly take based on what we know. By contrast, we are also free to revise our actions due to the revision principle; if we act a certain way due to our understanding of the world, and this action proves ineffective or wrong, we can reflect on what lead us to take such an action and learn how to act differently in the future. Hume addresses this issue by saying “such a uniformity in every particular [of human action], is found in no part in nature. On the contrary, from observing the variety of conduct in different men, we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims, which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity” (Baird, 401). There is still regularity and a sense of determination to the range of actions available to humans, despite the fact that there is liberty to decide between the “greater variety of maxims” accessible. Additionally, in following with the principles of revision of ideas through utilization of sympathy, Hume claims it is unjustified to view our actions as “uncaused.” Our actions are always justified because, if one follows with Hume’s revision process, one revises ideas, which come from our sensations and experiences, in order to act appropriately. Even if there exist “seeming irregularities” (Baird, 402) in actions, “the internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner” (Baird, 402); if the cause is not evident, there remains a hidden internal motive, coming from our experience of constant conjunctions and the inference of the association of A and B, for example, and that is our motivation. Our experience is the cause of our actions.

Hume reconciles determinism of our actions with human responsibility by focusing on the issues of morality in relation to how they connect to human empathy. He claims that “Liberty…is also essential to morality, and that no human actions, where it is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be the objects either of approbation or dislike” (Baird, 408). In order to elucidate his point, the philosopher goes on to liken moral and physical issues. He explains that the characters of which we approve in society are ones who “contribute to the peace and security of human society” (Baird, 409), while the characters who are blamed are ones who act to the detriment of society. Hume asserts that,

“It may reasonably be presumed, that the moral sentiments arise, either mediately or immediately, from a reflection of these opposite interests. What though philosophical meditations establish a different opinion or conjectures; that everything is right with regard to the WHOLE, and that the qualities, which disturb society, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare…” (Baird, 409).

More simply, within his general claim that we have innate sociability and thereby a set of generalized morals, the idea of human morality as a whole is dependent on the existence of both characters who promote security and who destroy society. These actions themselves are simply “indications of the internal character, passions, and affections” (Baird, 408) and “can give rise either to praise or blame” (Baird, 408) as they fit within the overarching morality of the society in question. Therefore, Hume’s revision process is applicable in regards to issues of morality—actions are changeable and are simply indications of internal character, rather than culpable in and of themselves. In following this principle, it would be possible for a murderer to be redeemed. Once the murderer is in jail, if he is able to reflect on his actions, understand how what he did was not useful and agreeable to himself and to others, and he does not murder again, he is no longer morally responsible for his actions. However, if the “actor” is not of sound mind and emotionally competent, meaning that he is not able to enact the revision principle and access the general point of view, or that the cause of his actions is a lasting character trait that inhibits him from moral actions, the actor is still responsible. For example, Jeffrey Dahmer, the legendary serial killer, rapist, and necrophile, should be held responsible for his actions because he was either unwilling, due to his lack of emotional soundness, to revise his actions for the general good, or his desire for murder was a lasting character trait that could never change. However, it is also the responsibility of the general public to intervene when someone is clearly acting against general morals. Jeffrey Dahmer’s best friend would have had the responsibility to intervene in his actions and try to stop him and help him revise his actions, rather than simply sit idly by. In summary, it is one’s responsibility to revise and correct one’s actions; if one does something morally reprehensible but goes on to enact the revision principle, one is no longer responsible; if one does something morally reprehensible but does not enact the revision principle, one is responsible; and it is the public’s responsibility to help actors revise their reprehensible actions as well.

It is possible to imagine a scenario in which Hume’s philosophy does not remain solid. Hume does not address the problem of prioritization of the four aspects of the revision process—agreeableness and usefulness to the self and to others. For example, if, when reflecting, one realizes that an action is agreeable to the self and others, but is not useful to the self and others, Hume does not clarify which two aspects should be prioritized. Presumably, one would have to decide upon a self-made scale of prioritization. Then, if the action went poorly, the revision process would begin again, and the scale would adjust accordingly in order for the next action to be different. Unfortunately, Hume never clarifies the proper path of action in such a situation. He simply states that “[Man] must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others: He must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and sympathy” (Beauchamp, part I, paragraph 6). In another instance, Hume discusses how incest in human species is criminal but in animals there is not “the smallest moral turpitude and deformity” (Norton, 301). He uses this example to claim that morality cannot be solely found in the relations of reason. If so, animals would be “susceptible of the same morality” (Baird, 301) of which humans are. This is clearly not true, and Hume, therefore, proves “that morality consists not in any relations, that are the object of science” (Baird, 301). While in humans, because of the “faculty” to discover the “turpitude” of incest, a sentiment that should keep them from being incestuous, when they go forth and act incestuously, they are morally culpable. However, many animals have evolved to avoid incest in order to keep the gene pool of a species diverse enough for continued reproductive success. Despite this rebuttal, it must be acknowledged that the theory of evolution was not yet prevalent; therefore this stance is an anachronism and not truly evidence against Hume’s argument.

Hume’s philosophy in A Treatise of Human Nature details a complex process of human empathy and reflective revision of actions. Empathy, or what Hume calls sympathy, comes from the consideration of usefulness and agreeableness of an action to the self and to others. He connects this process to the idea that actions are both determined and necessary; our actions have specific, known causes; and humans are, in most cases, morally responsible for their actions.  

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